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A central feature of stratified societies is the
unequal partition of power between its members.

Of

fundamental importance for social psychology is the

question of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
consequences of perceived power differentials, especially
from the perspective of the powerless.

As indicated by

literature reviews, this issue has, however, been largely
neglected.

One reason for this lacuna may be a confused

definition of the concept:

social power should be

distinguished from social influence and social status and
may rather be defined in terms of outcome control.

Because

a sense of control over one's outcomes is central to the

self-concept, the question of power becomes:

how will the

powerless cope with a threat to their sense of control?

As

suggested by research on impression formation, one strategy
may be to individuate the ones in power, i.e. to pay

particular attention to their idiosyncratic attributes, in
an effort to gain indirect outcome control.

iii

A first experiment investigated the effects
of
outgroup power and outgroup homogeneity on the

formation of

impressions of outgroup members, in a minimal
group
paradigm.

As predicted, results indicate that outgroup

power affected subjects' feeling of control, and led
them
to engage in more individuating impression formation
processes, but only when the ones in power were perceived
as a collection of individuals to begin with (heterogeneous

condition)

.

This individuating effect of power did not

occur when the ones in power were perceived as

outgroup (homogeneous condition)

.

a

salient

Results are discussed in

light of the continuum model of impression formation.

The

differential impact of perceived power, depending of its
social categorization, opens fascinating perspectives on

intergroup relation processes.

iv
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Many philosophers and social scientists
have argued
that power should be the focus of social
sciences;

to

quote Bertrand Russell (1938,
"i shall be concerned
p lo)
to prove that the fundamental concept
in social sciences is
:

Power,

in the same sense in which Energy is
the fundamental

concept in Physics."

As a matter of fact, the central

feature of stratified societies is the unequal
partition of
power among its members: social control (which is

essential to society) presupposes a power structure for
the

differentiated application of sanctions (Dahrendorf

,

1968)

In other words, the fact that some individuals are in a

structural position to evaluate and sanction the behavior
of other individuals is a keystone of social functioning.
If indeed power is a central aspect of social interactions,
a crucial problem for psychologists is the question of the

psychological consequences of power differentials in
interpersonal and intergroup relations.

Of particular

interest to the understanding of social change processes is
the issue of cognitive, emotional and behavioral

consequences of perceived power differentials from the
point of view of the powerless.
The present thesis is an attempt at understanding how

people form impressions of powerful others.

Do people tend

2

to individualize and pay particular
attention to the ones
in power, perceiving them as a
collection of

"personalities"?

or on the contrary, do they categorize

them quickly as "the bosses"?

After discussing some issues

on social power, psychological control,
and impression

formation processes,

I

shall present the results of an

experiment investigating, in an intergroup
setting, the
effects of outgroup power and homogeneity on
forming

impressions of outgroup members.

CHAPTER

SOCIAL POWER:

2

CIRCUMSCRIBING THE CONCEPT

A number of psychologists have insisted
on the
importance of power to the understanding of
human
interactions. As Sik Hung Ng (1980,
254) stated
p

it:

"The conditions under which human beings
live are to a
large extent shaped by the social arrangement of
power

which therefore should not be left out of social
psychology." Surprisingly, however, the power variable
remains largely absent from empirical research.

Power is

still a "neglected variable" in social psychology
(Cartwright, 1959), and may be the most neglected aspect of

small group research (Sherif, 1962).

Many authors have

pointed out that much of the experimental work on
intergroup relations has ignored the question of power
(e.g., Apfelbaum,

1979a,

1979b; Billig, 1976; Brown, 1988;

Condor and Brown, 1986; Deschamps, 1982; Hogg and Abrams,
1988; Ng,

1980,

1982; Sachdev and Bourhis,

A

1985).

widespread feeling among researchers is that the "reality"
of power cannot be easily simulated in laboratory settings
(e.g., Hollander,

power?

I

1985).

But what is this "reality" of

want to argue here that the lack of research on

power is partly due to a confused definition of the
concept.

3

4

Power as Social

influf^nr.f^

Among sociologists, the concept
of power proves to be
compelling yet troublesome. it is
often used in a very
broad sense, presenting many faces,
and therefore
condemning any attempt at a single
general answer to the
question.
in Bierstedt's terms (1950,
"in the
p 730):
entire lexicon of social concepts none
is more troublesome
than the concept of power. We may say
about it only what
St. Augustine said about time, that we
all know perfectly
what it is until someone asks us" (see also
Kaufman and
Jones, 1954; Parenti, 1978; for a review see
Lukes, 1986).

Psychologists have encountered the same difficulty in

dealing with the concept of power, used in some overlapping
and contradictory ways (Turner, 1991; for a review see Ng,
1980)

.

However, most of them seem to have chosen to define

power in terms of influence, or even to use the terms
interchangeably (Hollander, 1985)

.

In so doing they

adopted a philosophical tradition conceiving of power as
the production of intended effects (Russell, 1938) or the

capacity to produce them (Weber, 1947)

.

Indeed, most of

the definitions of power proposed by social psychologists

refer to the ability to exert interpersonal influence to a
point where the concepts appear to be synonymous.

In the

tradition of field theory, power is conceived as the
potential for effecting changes in the world (Lewin, 1951)

.

One would then say that A has power over B when A can get B

5

to do something that B would not
otherwise do (Dahl, 1957)
or when A has the capacity to
influence B in a direction

desired by A (Pruitt, 1976).

social power would be the

potential to direct the behavior of
another person more so
than the other way around (Mulder,
1977)

m

.

this

tradition, power is a construct which
accounts for the
portion of influence that is under the actor's
control:
"Power refers to the ability to achieve ends
through
influence" (Huston, 1983, p 170; see also
Cartwright, 1959;

Hersey and Blanchard, 1982; Lippitt et al.,
1952; Veroff,
1957; Willis and Levine, 1976; Winter, 1973; Wrong,
1979).

Power is measured as the amount of successful influence
(Lippitt et al., 1952; Mayhew et al., 1969; Peplau,
1979;

Strodbeck, 1951; Szinovacz, 1981), so the many bases of

power described by psychologists (French

&

Raven, 1959;

Hinkin and Shriesham, 1989; Kelman, 1961; Raven and
Kruglanski, 1970; Staheski et al., 1989; Tedeschi et al.,
1972)

are in fact bases of influence.

Together with this conception of power as influence,
many psychologists seem to have adopted Nietzsche's (1968)

assumption of a fundamental "will to power" in human beings
(e.g., Adler,

Winter, 1973)

1966;
.

McClelland, 1975;

Mulder, 1977;

However, considering the negative

connotations of power (Ng, 1980) as well as the costs of

power (responsibility)

,

it is not clear whether people are

systematically motivated to influence, or be in a position

6

to influence others.

More clear is that people dislike,

resent and seek to avoid attempts
by other to influence
them.

In any cases, to equate power
with influence leads one

to consider power as a process
or a consequence, but not as
a determinant of social interactions
(hence, a lack of
empirical studies manipulating power as
an independent
variable)
Such an approach does not account for
power as
a structural aspect of organized
societies.
Nor does it
.

answer the question of the psychological
consequences of
perceived power differentials. in order to do
so,

it is

necessary to differentiate the concept of social
power from
that of social influence: power can lead to
influence,
but

not systematically, and influence can have other
bases than

power (see Moscovici, 1976; Turner, 1991).
Power as Social Status

Willing to integrate individual and societal levels of
analysis, psychologists interested in intergroup relations

have attempted to understand how individuals' cognitions,
emotions, and behaviors influence and are influenced by

relations between groups.

They conceived of society as a

stratification of social groups that stand in power,
status, and prestige relation to one another (Hogg and

Abrams, 1988)

.

Social Identity theorists then assumed

that, given a need for self-esteem, people are motivated to

establish favorable intergroup comparisons between their

7

group and other groups (see
Brewer, 1979; Taj f el and
Turner, 1979, 1986).
By doing so (e.g., discriMinating
against outgroups) , they can reach
or maintain a positive
social identity.
Clearly, the focus of this
approach to intergroup

behavior is on group status.

The question of power,

however, has been rather quickly
handled by assimilating
power to status: power has been implicitly
conceived as
one of the valued attributes in the
process of intergroup
comparison. To my mind a confusion between
power and
status would jeopardize any attempt at
understanding the
specific effects of perceived power. Indeed, some
data
have indicated that power's connotation is
negative (Ng,

or that it does not correlate with self-esteem

1980)

(Kipnis,

1972).

People seem to have ambivalent feelings

(composed of admiration and suspicion) toward the ones in
power.

Furthermore, there exist instances where power and

status positions within a social structure are discrepant
(Lenski, 1984)

.

For example, although scientists have

often more prestige than politicians, the latter have more

power than the former.

It is therefore necessary to

consider power and status as different factors in the study
of intergroup relations (Ng, 1980, 1982; Nigro and Serine,
1985; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1985, 1991).

A few empirical studies have then started to
investigate the effects of group power on intergroup

8

discrimination (Ng, 1982; Sachdev
and Bourhis, 1985,1991).
In these experiments, group
power, the independent
variable, was operationalized as
the amount of control each
group had over the resources
allocated to both groups,
while intergroup discrimination, the
dependent variable,
consisted in the actual resources that
subjects would
allocate to ingroup and outgroup members.
Results
indicated that ingroup power increases
discrimination
toward the outgroup. These results were
interpreted in
terms of Social Identity Theory: The search
for positive
social identity is the psychological antecedent
to

discriminatory behavior and power enables group
members to
discriminate effectively. Obviously, power is here
reduced
to a mediating variable, a "can factor", which
leads to the

rather disappointing conclusion that one discriminates
when
one can.

I

believe that power is more than

a

trivial

mediating variable and has some specific psychological
impact that needs to be dealt with.
Power as Outcome Control

Approaching power as a structural aspect of social
interactions,

I

argued that it should be distinguished from

the concept of social influence.

I

also pointed out that

power cannot be assimilated with social status.

I

would

also argue that social power has to be defined in terms of
the relationships that bind individuals or social groups
together.

From a social exchange perspective, the

9

interdependence between persons is
specified by how they
control one another's outcomes
which include, on one hand,
rewards and punishments and, on
the other hand, costs and
benefits (Kelley, 1979). One could
then say that A has
power over B when A has some control
over B's outcomes.
The amount of power that A has over
B would be defined by
the amount of control A has over B's
outcomes (the amount
of control referring not only to the
extent of control but
to the range and type of outcomes being
controlled)
A
power relation would then refer to a situation
.

of

interdependence between social actors, whether
symmetrical
or asymmetrical.
But one could want to restrict the use of
power relation to refer to situations of asymmetrical
interdependence. In that case one would say that A has

power over B when A has more control over B's outcomes than
the other way around. Assuming that there is no third
party involved, the amount of power would be defined by the
amount of control A has over it's own outcomes as well as
over those of B (for such a definition of group power see
Jones, 1972; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1985).

However, if one wants to convey the structural

dimension of power in stratified societies (some people
being in a position to evaluate and sanction other people)
it may be necessary to include the notion of role

differentiation in the definition.

A power relation would

not only be characterized by asymmetrical interdependence

10

but by non-reciprocal
interdependence, i.e. by dependency.
As a working definition, I shall
propose here that, in a
given social situation, A has power
over B when A has some
control over B's outcomes and not
the other way around.

The amount of power A has over B in
this situation is
defined by the amount of control that
A has over B's
outcomes (extent, range, and type of
outcomes affected).
One could object to this definition that,
in many social
situations, the subordinates have some control
over the
superiors -outcomes as the latter depend, to
a certain
extent, on the former.
I would argue, however, that this

"secondary" power relation is a by-product of the
primary
one which remains non-reciprocal: The secondary
relation

may be perceived, or not, as a possible counter-power
depending on many "empowering" factors that are beyond the
scope of the present work.

In order to avoid confusion I

shall define power as non-reciprocal outcome control.

Following this attempt to define social power, what

hypothesis can be made about cognitive, emotional, and
behavioral effects of perceived power differentials?

Whether a power relation is referred to as interdependence,
asymmetrical interdependence, or dependency, the emphasis
is on the control of outcomes.

I

shall therefore suggest,

in the next section, that some preliminary hypotheses can

be derived from the literature on psychological control.

CHAPTER

3

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTROL AND SOCIAL POWER

Control as

a

B asic

Motivation

Many psychologists have postulated

a

general motive to

feel and exert control over environmental
occurrences, a
sense of personal control being viewed
as integral to the
self concept (Bandura, 1977; DeCharms,
1968; Fenichel,
1945; Heider,
1959)

.

1958; Hendrick,

1943; Kelly,

1955; White,

A number of cognitive theorists have suggested
that

causal inferences and attributional activity arise
from

a

desire to render the world predictable and controllable
(Heider,

1958; Jones and Davis,

1965; Kelley,

1967).

Consistent with this idea are the data showing that control

deprivation fosters attribution analyses and renders
subjects more attentive and accurate in processing

information (d'Agostino and Pittman, 1982; McCaul, 1983;
Pittman and d'Agostino, 1985; Pittman
Swann et al., 1981).

&

Pittman,

1980;

Clearly, the new "New Look" in social

cognition, focusing on "hot cognitions", i.e. motivated

cognitions, gives particular importance to control

motivation (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, 1991; Higgins and
Sorrentino, 1990; Pittman

&

Heller, 1987; Weary et al.,

in

press)

Apart from boosting information processing, two main

patterns of reaction to loss of control are described in
11
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the literature.

The first one, reactance to
perceived loss
of freedom (Brehm, 1966; Brehm
and Brehm, 1981; Wortxnan
and
Brehm, 1975; Wicklund, 1974), is
characterized by reactions
of anger, hostility, and behavioral
efforts to restore
perceived freedom. Some research
suggests that a threat to
a person's sense of control instigates
aggression, which
can be interpreted as serving to
restore perceived control
(Horwitz, 1958; McKellar, 1977; Worchel
et al., 1978).
The
second reaction to loss of control, learned
helplessness,
arises when control-restoring efforts
remain unrewarded
(Abramson, et al., 1978; Seligman, 1975).
it is

characterized by a pattern of affective, cognitive,
and
motivational deficits such as passivity, anxiety,
and

depression.

It may be that loss of control will lead to

reactance when the expectation for control is high and to

helplessness when the expectation is low (Wortman and
Brehm, 1975)

Control as an Adaptive Illusion

Several authors have suggested that more important

than effective control over environmental occurrences is
the belief in such control.

Control may well be an

adaptive illusion (Taylor and Brown, 1988)

.

Indeed, people

usually tend to overestimate their degree of control over
outcomes determined by chance (Goffman, 1967; Langer, 1975;

Langer and Roth, 1975; for a review see Crocker, 1982).
They also tend to overestimate personal causation (Miller

13

and ROSS, 1975) and favor
personality as an explanation for
behavior (Ross, 1977).
short, people tend to bel leve
that the world is controllable
(Lemer, 1970)
Hence, in
an answer to Skinner's famous
essay (Beyond Fr..Hn. ..h
Dignity, 1971), Lefcourt (1973)
argued that whatever the
reality of control is, it is a
meaningful perception for
people: while freedom and control
are both illusions,
inventions of people to make sense of
their experience,
they do have important behavioral
consequences.

m

.

Indeed, much evidence indicates that a
feeling of
control has important adaptive value, it
helps in coping

with aversive events and acts as a buffer against
stress
(e.g., Cohen and Edwards, in press; for a
review see

Thomson, 1981)

.

A belief in personal control leads to

better performance and more success in tasks (e.g.,
Brunstein and Olbrich, 1985; Burger, 1985; Diener and
Dweck, 1980)

In fact, numerous studies suggest that a

.

sense of control is an important factor of mental health
and that a loss of control plays a central role in

depression (for reviews see Alloy and Abramson, 1988;

Taylor and Brown, 1988)

.

Most personality psychologists,

investigating individual differences in need for control
(see Matthews,

(Rotter, 1966)

1982)
,

and internal/external locus of control

have emphasized the adaptive value of

internal sense of control (for a review see Strickland,
1989)

.

14

Primary and

S&cnnrj^r-y contrni

in the studies previously
mentioned (describing
control as a basic motivation
or adaptive illusion)
the
notion of control is generally
restricted to direct
,

personal control over environmental
occurrences.
However,
some researchers have pointed out
different forms of
control (see Thomson, 1981): mainly
primary control
(gaining control by influencing reality)
has been
distinguished from secondary control
(gaining
control by

accommodating to reality)

.

Although primary control is

valued in occidental cultures, and secondary
control
emphasized in oriental values (individualism
and autonomy
versus fit with environment and collectivism)
one
,

can

argue that they both reveal a need to feel
in control
(Weisz et al.,

1984).

Among secondary forms of control is

vicarious secondary control, i.e. a tendency to align
with
powerful entities in order to enhance one's sense of
power
(Fromm,

1941; Hetherington and Frankie, 1967; Johnson and

Downing, 1979)

.

Other forms of secondary control include

illusory secondary control, i.e. attributing outcomes to
chance or luck as an attempt to feel allied with the forces
of fate (Kahle, 1980; Weisz, 1983), and interpretive

secondary control, i.e. changing perspective on realities
in order to get meaning from them.

Altogether, it seems reasonable to postulate in human

beings a general need to feel in control, a need that can

15

be expressed in various
ways (e.g., group identification,
religious belief, etc..) when
direct personal control over
environmental occurrences is not
perceived as possible.
Psychol oaical Contr-oi anH
p^.^.^^.

From this review of the control
literature, what can
be said about the issue of social
power? Remember that I
defined social power as controlling
the outcomes of another
individual or group.
I have suggested that
people are
motivated to control their own outcomes,
but it is not
clear whether people are motivated to
control
others'

outcomes, i.e. to have social power.

Maybe social power

can be sought as a default option when
one feels one cannot
have direct control over one's own outcomes.
Controlling
other's outcomes, in an interdependent situation,
can be an
indirect way to control one's own outcomes through
social
influence.

But what to say about cognitive, emotional, and

behavioral consequences of power relations for the
powerless?

Interesting data from Beauvois and Dubois (1988)
suggest that the tendency to make internal explanation of

behavior (internal attribution) and of outcomes (internal
locus of control) arises from the exercise of power.

According to them, this "norm of internality" differs among
social groups as it serves the function of justifying of

one's power position.

That is, internal explanation of

behavior and outcomes justify the act of evaluating and

sanctioning others.
expect

m

line with this idea one
would

xnexobers

of dominated groups,
experiencing prolonged
exposure to powerlessness, to
develop a low sense of
personal control. if one accept
the principle of a general
motive for control, one would also
expect this low sense of
personal control to be compensated
by the development of
secondary forms of control. For example,
one can expect
females, as a dominated group, to
develop a lower sense of
personal control than males, as well as
some forms of

secondary control:

Hence the classical gender difference

on instrumental versus relational
orientations, individual

versus collective identity (see Lorenzi-cioldi,
1988).
In the case of a temporary exposure to
powerlessness,

people should experience a threat resulting in
a decrease
of the feeling of personal control. This may
seem

to be a

truism as

I

defined power in terms of outcomes control.

However, it opens new perspectives and numerous hypotheses

about the issue of powerlessness.

Given the need to feel

in control, the question of power becomes:

How do the

powerless cope with a loss of control and restore a sense
of control in a specific situation?

If the power relation

cannot be challenged, one way may be to try to influence or
adapt to the ones in power, in an attempt to get indirect
control over one's outcomes.

But this would probably

require forming an accurate impression of the powerful
persons, to be able to predict their behavior.

CHAPTER

4

IMPRESSION FORMATION, CONTROL,
AND POWER

impression Formation and Tn-h^rdenP,nH^n^o

How do people form impressions
of powerful others?
The general question of impression
formation processes is
clearly a core question for the
understanding
of social

interactions.

Classically, social cognition theorists
have

stressed the importance of category-based
cognitive
schemata, i.e. stereotypes, in impression
formation (for
review, see Fiske and Taylor, 1991, Chapters
4

and 5).

a

it

has been suggested that, because people have
limited

cognitive capacity, they first tend to categorize
targets
according to available labels, and then rely heavily

on the

cognitive schemata, thereby activated, while forming an
impression.

Indeed, stereotypes have been shown to bias

information processing at levels of encoding, memory, as
well as inferences.

For example, when asked to form an

impression of another person, people attend more to

information that is consistent with their stereotypical
expectations.
In the last decade, however, researchers have been

more and more interested in motivational factors that
influence cognitive processes, picturing the human

processor more as
miser".

a

"motivated tactician" than a "cognitive

In this line, Fiske and Neuberg (1990), have
17
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proposed a continuum model of impression
formation: They
suggested that, although category-based
impressions are the
default option, people can move towards
more individuating
processes when motivated to do so. Among
those motivating
factors, control motivation has been
given particular
importance. Much data have indeed suggested
that in

situations of interdependence, i.e. when target
and
perceiver's outcomes are under joint control,
perceivers
tend to form more individuated impressions of
the target
(Berscheid et al., 1976; Erber and Fiske, 1984; Fiske
and
Von Hendy, in press; Neuberg and Fiske, 1987; Ruscher
and
Fiske, 1990).

Under conditions of outcome dependency, the

perceivers pay more attention to the target's attributes,
especially to those attributes that are inconsistent with

category-based expectations.

They also make more

dispositional inferences about the target and tend to form

more complex impressions.

These results were interpreted

in terms of control motivation:

When one's outcomes are

controlled, in part, by another person, one will pay

particular attention to that person's attributes
(especially the inconsistent ones as they are potentially

more informative) in an effort to regain control.

In other

words, research on impression formation and interdependence

has suggested that, given a need for control,

interdependence-induced control deprivation will result in

more individuating impression formation processes.

This

19

interpretation, however, raises some
issues related to the
kind of interdependence that
researchers have considered:
symmetrical interpersonal interdependence.

Impressio n Format io n and Powo.r

Re1ai-ir>n

Most research has indeed dealt with
cooperative
interdependence, in which perceiver and
target's outcomes
were positively correlated (e.g., Erber
and
Fiske, 1984;

Neuberg and Fiske, 1987).

It can then be argued that the

issue of outcomes control is confounded with
phenomena of
unit formation or ingroup categorization, which
could be

responsible for the individuating effect.

Some research

investigating competitive interdependence, in which

perceiver and target's outcomes are negatively correlated,
has, however, confirmed the individuating effect of

interdependence (Ruscher and Fiske, 1990)

.

Yet, to my

mind, it is still difficult to ascertain that the

individuating effect is due to the control manipulation in
itself.

Some sort of unit formation cannot be totally

overruled as long as research is restricted to symmetrical
interdependence.

Both target and perceiver had equal

control over the outcomes and were assigned the same role:
The target may well have been perceived as a kind of

teammate in the situation.

A further test of the continuum

model of impression formation would then be to manipulate

directly the amount of control the target has over the
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perceiver's outcomes in a non-reciprocal
situation, i.e. in
a situation of power relation.
Remember that power relations, as
characterized by role differentiation

I

defined them, are

and outcome

dependency:

A has control over B's outcomes,
but not the
other way around. The amount of power
of A is defined by
the amount of control A has over B's
outcomes,
if control

motivation is responsible for individuating
processes in
impression formation we would expect that:
(a) The more
the target has power over the perceiver, the
more
the

perceiver will experience a loss of personal control
This will result in a more individuating impression

(b)

of the

target (more attention to inconsistent information,
more

dispositional inferences)

.

These predictions would be

consistent with data suggesting that people have well-

developed schemata for those in power (Rush and Russell,
1988; Sande et al.,

1986).

Another question that arises from research on
impression formation is the one of interpersonal versus
intergroup situations.

Indeed, most of the research has

dealt with interpersonal interdependence, suggesting an
individuating effect of both interpersonal cooperation and
competition.

I

have just suggested that the individuating

effect should also appear in powerless perceivers as a
function of targets' power.
in intergroup situations?

But would this effect appear

With observing natural
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Situations, it is doubtful that
ingroup members will
individualize members of an outgroup
competing or having
power over them. Available data
would rather suggest that
intergroup competition leads to
stereotyping (Sherif et
alw 1961). in a recent study, Ruscher and
her colleagues
(Ruscher et al., in press) have
investigated impression
formation in interpersonal versus
intergroup competition.
In the interpersonal condition,
subjects were competing on
a one-to-one basis, while in the
intergroup condition, they
were cooperating with ingroup members
and competing against
outgroup members. Results showed that
subjects

individualized the opponents in the interpersonal
situation
but not in the intergroup situation.
in the latter,
subjects were shown to individualize ingroup members.

This

individualization of ingroup members was proposed as an

explanation for the lack of individualization of outgroup
members:

Attention to ingroup members would have drained

subjects' limited attentional resources.

To test this

interpretation, it would be necessary to manipulate the

intergroup/ interpersonal dimension in a way that could
control for the impact of ingroup members on subjects.

Such a paradigm is available in the intergroup relations
litterature.

Intergroup theorists have suggested that group

behaviors can be elicited in minimal conditions, without
any kind of interdependence or interaction between group
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members (Tajfel et al., 1971).

The mere fact of

categorizing subjects into groups,
without people knowing
or seeing each other is sufficient
to
induce ingroup bias

(Brewer, 1979).

The important variable is then
purely
cognitive, in terms of self -categorization
(Turner et al.,
1987); every human interaction can then be
conceptualized
on a continuum from interpersonal
relations
(acting in

terms of personal identity) to intergroup
relations (acting
in terms of social identity; Tajfel,
1978).
order to
activate the "Us versus Them" dimension, one
can manipulate
the cognitive salience of a categorization,
in perceptual
terms, a stimulus is salient, grabs the
attention, when it
stands out in the context (Taylor and Fiske,

m

1978)

.

In

self-categorization terms, a categorization is salient when
it maximizes intergroup differences an intragroup

similarities (Oakes, 1987).

For example, if

l

belong to

group of females and the other group is made of males, the

males-versus-females categorization is cognitively salient,
or relevant.

But if

I

belong to a group of females and the

other group is made of both males and females, the males-

versus-females categorization is less salient.

In other

words, by manipulating the homogeneity of the outgroup, one

can make a categorization more or less salient and elicit

more interpersonal or intergroup behaviors.
I shall

therefore investigate the

interpersonal/ intergroup dimension, by manipulating the
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perceived homogeneity of the
outgroup, in a minimal group
situation (no interdependence or
interaction)
Outgroup
members would either belong to one
category (homogeneous
.

condition) or to different categories
(heterogeneous
condition)
I expect that ial
the heterogeneous
condition, in which the outgroup are
perceived as
.

m

individuals, so the interaction is
interpersonal, outgroup
power will have the individuating effect
that I predicted
for interindividual situations
Ibl
the homogeneous
condition, in which the outgroup are perceived

m

as a group,

so the interaction is intergroup, outgroup
power will not
lead to individuation. Indeed, when the ones
in power are

perceived as a collection of individuals,

a good

strategy

to gain indirect control over one's outcomes may
be to pay

particular attention in order to adapt one's behavior and
influence the powerful persons.

However, when the ones in

power are perceived as an outgroup, such strategy may not
be chosen because outgroups are expected to discriminate

against the ingroup (Leyens and Schadron, 1980) and

outgroups members are perceived as strongly committed to
their own group norms and therefore more difficult to
influence (Horwitz and Rabbie, 1982).
Altogether, these hypotheses provide further test of
the predictions of the continuum model of impression

formation related to control motivation.

They also suggest

how perceived power differentials could affect the
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powerless, and one of the ways
the powerless may cope with
a loss of personal control.

CHAPTER

5

THE EXPERIMENT

Overview

The following experiment manipulated
perceived
outgroup power and homogeneity, in a
minimal group
situation. Subjects, run individually
in the lab, believed
they would have to perform a concentration
task together
with other subjects. They also believed
that a group of
distractors would have more or less power over
them, and

would be either homogeneous (people from one
category) or
heterogenous (people from different categories)
I
.

expected subjects to report feeling less in control
in the
high power than low power condition. I also expected

that

this loss of control would lead to individuating

impressions of the distractors in the heterogeneous

condition (more attention to information that is
inconsistent with stereotypical expectations, more

dispositional inferences) but that this effect would not
appear in the homogeneous condition (if anything the
reverse is expected, i.e. more stereotypic impressions)

.

Method
Stimulus Material

Two pre-tests were conducted in order to choose the
social categories and their associated stereotypes to be

used in the experiment.

The aim was to select a set of
25
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traits that would be relevant
to two different categories
(the traits perceived as
consistent with the first category
being perceived as inconsistent
with the second, and the
other way around) so that the
category membership of the
target of the impression could be
counterbalanced in the
experimental design. I decided to
investigate the
stereotypes held by psychology students
about students
having other college majors, as categories
of relevance to
students
In a first step, 200 psychology students
were asked to
select, from a list of 109 personality
traits, the most

typical traits associated with 20 different
college majors
(for each major, n=50)
On the basis of the frequencies

of

.

the traits selected for each major, four pairs
of majors

displaying clear and opposite stereotypes were chosen
(i.e., Art/Business, Art/Mathematics, Business/Physical

Education, Mathematics/Physical Education)

.

For each pair,

inconsistent traits were generated and added to the list of

consistent traits.
In a second step, 80 psychology students rated the

consistency/inconsistency of the traits, for both majors of
each pair, on seven point Likert scales (for each pair,
n=20)

.

The pair Art/Mathematics was chosen as showing the

clearest and most opposite stereotypes.

From the ratings,

a list of eight traits was constituted such as four traits

were perceived as consistent with Art but inconsistent with
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Mathematics, and four other traits
were perceived as
consistent with Mathematics but
inconsistent with Art (see
Table 1)

From these eight traits, eight
short sentences of
self -description were generated.
These sentences were
constructed so that no information would
be added

to the

traits, for example, for logical:

logical in all

I

do."

"i try to be very

The number of words in the four

sentences consistent with Art and in the four
sentences
consistent with Math was identical. The eight

sentences,

handwritten in an androgenous style on different sheets
of
paper, constituted the stimulus materials for the

impression formation (see APPENDIX

A)

Research Design
The experiment used a

Outgroup Power (low, high)
high)

,

x

2

x

2

factorial design with

Outgroup Homogeneity (low,

and Target's Category (math, art) as between-subjects

variables.
a

2

Target's Category was included in the design as

counterbalancing variable.
Subjects

The subjects were 99 undergraduate psychology majors
(37 males,

62 females)

.

They were randomly assigned to

each of the conditions created by the between-subjects
variables, with approximately the same proportion of males
and females per condition.

Subjects were contacted by

phone and asked to participate a group experiment
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Table 1. Stimulus materials:
Ratings of
consistency/inconsistency for Art and Math
majors
Art Major

Creative
Emotional

M

t(19)

+2.80

30.0
j.^

+2

35

. \i

Math manor
n

M

.

000

-1.35

*t . JL

.

UUO

-1.20

4.7

.000

i:(i9)

P

Individualistic

+2.35

10.6

.000

-0.80

3.4

.003

Impulsive

+ 1.95

8.7

.000

-1.20

4.7

.000

Studious

-1. 15

3.8

.001

+2.65

24.2

.000

Logical

-0.80

4.0

.001

+2.55

15.0

.000

Traditional

-1.50

6.4

.000

+1.60

6.8

.000

Conventional

-1.50

4.8

.000

+1.55

5.3

.000
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entitled "How to study at home with
noisy housemates", in
exchange for one extra credit toward
their course grade.
The experimenter explained on the
phone that the aim of the
experiment was to measure students'
ability to concentrate
in a distracting environment,
while trying to arrange an
appointment, the experimenter insisted on
the necessity to
find a time which would be convenient
for all
five

subjects.

It was also stressed that, because it
was a

group experiment, it was important to be on
time for the
appointment. The experiment would last approximately
40

minutes
Procedure

Subjects were run individually as described in this
section.

When introduced into the laboratory, the subject

could see a row of five empty chairs, with numbers from one
to five.

Facing these chairs was another set of three

chairs with androgenous coats and back-packs on them.

The

experimenter explained that, because of a last minute
inconvenience (one of the five subjects could not arrive on
time)

,

he had to postpone the experiment for half-an-hour

Although he could get in touch with the three other
subjects, he apologized for not having had enough time to

advise her of this change.

The experimenter also explained

that, because of a meeting afterwards, he could not stay

longer than originally planned and would therefore have to

make the experiment shorter.

The experiment was supposedly
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composed of two phases:

In a preparation phase,
lasting

about 20 minutes, subjects would
be asked to fill out some
questionnaires, in a second phase,
lasting 20 minutes too,
the group experiment itself would be
taking place.
Because
the experiment would start later today,
the questionnaire

part would be skipped.

The experimenter proposed however

to the subject to do the questionnaire
part while waiting
for the others to arrive. All subjects
accepted this

proposition.

After checking on

a list,

the experimenter

told the subject she was subject

#3

invited her to sit in chair #3.

Under this chair was

hidden a microphone, connected to

a

in today's group and

tape recorder which was

concealed in another part of the room.
Experimental manipulation
Once the subject was seated, the experimenter said he

would first briefly describe the experiment that was to
take place half an hour later.

An instruction sheet,

describing the experimental manipulations, was handed out
to the subject and read aloud by the experimenter (see

APPENDIX

B)

.

The experiment was described as a test of

concentration abilities in

a

distracting environment.

Subjects, five psychology majors, would have to complete a

task requiring concentration (writing down multiples of
three, as fast as possible and without mistakes) and would
be rewarded as a function of their performance (the final

number they would have reached after 20 minutes)

.

Facing
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them would sit three other
students playing the role of
"distractors". The experimenter
explained that the
distractors had already arrived
(hence the coats on the
chairs) and were currently being
briefed about their role
in another room.
the Low Po wer

m

condition, the

distractors were supposed to "speak
loudly to each other in
order to distract you from your work",
the High Power
condition, they would "do whatever they
want

m

(except

touching you) in order to distract you from
your work. They
will also watch you and each time they think
you have been
distracted, even slightly, they will make you
start again
from scratch". The subject was told that, in
order to
avoid the distractors knowing them and being biased,
the

distractors had not been recruited among psychology
students.

In the Low Homogeneity condition, the

experimenter said:

"Actually, one is a Math major, another

an Art major and the third a Business major" (for the Math

Target condition) or "Actually, one is an Art major,

another a Math major and the third a Business major" (for
the Art Target condition)

condition he said:

.

In the High Homogeneity

"Actually, they are Math majors" (for

the Math Target condition) or "Actually they are Art

majors" (for the Art Target condition)

Dependent Measures
Emotions and Control

.

After having read the

instructions, the experimenter asked the subject to fill
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out a first questionnaire concerning
"What is your current
mood right now, and what do you
think your concentrati<.on
abilities are?" This was justified
by explaining that
maybe concentration performances
can be affected by the
mood people are in. The questions
were designed to assess
subject's emotional reactions and feeling
of control (s<see
APPENDIX C)

Attention TimP

.

After the first questionnaire was

filled out, the experimenter explained that
in a natural
situation, such as working at home with noisy

housemates,

people usually know the persons by whom they
are being
distracted.
In the present situation, however,

subjects

would not know the distractors at all.

Out of a concern

for realism, the experimenter wanted, therefore,
the

subjects to have an idea of who the distractors were before
the concentration test starts.

But at the same time the

experimenter did not want subjects and distractors to meet
each other before the test because this could have biased
the distractors.

This explanation justified the fact that

the distractors had been asked to describe themselves prior
to the experiment and that this information was shown to

the subject.

It was explained that, to make the task

easier for the distractors, they had been presented with a
list of personality traits on different sheets of paper and

asked to select the traits that best fit them as well as

write a brief sentence of self-description for each trait.
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At this point, a folder containing
our stimulus material s
and marked "Distractor #1, Major:
Math" or "Distractor #i.
Major:
Art" was presented to the
subject.
The eight pages
(the four consistent and four
inconsistent information)

contained in the folder were placed
in a random order.
The
subject was specifically asked to
"study these traits and
try to form an impression of the
first distractor." The
subject was also asked to read the
material aloud so that
the experimenter could verify that the
subject understood
the hand-writing of this distractor.
in fact,

This would be used,

for the coding of the attention time to
consistent

and inconsistent information.

Indeed, while he was getting

the folder with the traits, the experimenter
also turned on
the hidden tape recorder that would record the
sound of the

pages being turned as well as the voice of the subject
and

provide a measure of the time spent studying each piece of
information.

Dispositional
tiie

I nferences

and Impression Formed

.

Once

previous task was completed, the experimenter explained

that the concentration test would be run several times with

different group of subjects, but he was not sure whether to
keep the same distractors or not.

For that reason, it was

interesting for him to know what kind of impact these

distractors have on people.

Specifically, the subject was

asked to give first impressions of the first distractor, by

answering a second questionnaire.

It was made clear that
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the answers would be kept
confidential.
These questi ons
were designed to assess the
dispositional inference s
subjects would make about the
target, as well as th e
quality of the impression formed
in terms of positivity a nd
typicality (see APPENDIX D)

Once the last questionnaire was
filled out,
approximately 30 minutes had passed
since the subject was
first introduced into the lab. The
procedure of impression
formation did not go on for the other
distractors, nor did
the "concentration test".
Rather, the experimenter,

checking his watch, proposed to interrupt
the procedure
because the others should arrive at any
moment.

The

subject was first checked for suspicion and
then carefully
debriefed. The subject was given extra credit
and a

lottery was planned to distribute the money subjects
could
have won according to the cover story. After being

debriefed for 15 minutes, no subjects showed signs of
resentment for having been deceived and all consented that
their data would be used for research purposes.
Variables Coding

Attention Time
One judge, blind to conditions, coded the time spent
by each subject on studying the four inconsistent and the
four consistent information.

This was done, using a stop-

watch, from the sound of the turning pages recorded on the

audiotape.

The coding resulted in a total attention time

for consistencies and
a

total attention time for

inconsistencies for each subject,
occur on the recorded material,

should an anO^iguity

the observation was coded

as missing data. This
happened for 12 of the 99
subjects.
Also, for technical reasons,
the recording was not

available for eight other subjects.

Finally, the attention

time for inconsistent information
of one subject, being
over three standard deviation
from the mean, was deleted
from the analysis^
.Dispositional

Tnferenr^pc;

For each subject, the number of
inferred personality
traits was recorded. All in all, 86
traits had been
inferred in the Art target condition
and 85 in the Math
target condition, resulting in a total
of 144 different
traits.
Nine judges (psychology students) were
asked to
code these traits, using seven point
Likert
scales, on

three dimensions:

typicality/ atypicality for Math

students, typical ity/atypicality for Art students,
general

positivity/negativity.

Judgments were highly reliable,

(for all three combined, Alpha=.89).

From these judgments,

the traits inferred by each subject could be coded as
typical, atypical or irrelevant to the target's category,
as well as positive, negative or neutral.

For each

The data of five subjects for the second
questionnaire (impression formed), who had reported being
suspicious at this point of the experiment, were also
deleted from subsequent analyses.

subject, available data
on dispositional
inferences wereTotal nuMber of traits,
number of typical,
atypical and
irrelevant traits, number of
positive, negative and
neutral
traits

Results

Emotions and Control
subjects' answers to each
question of the first
questionnaire were entered into an
analysis of variance:
Outgroup Power (low, high), Outgroup
Homogeneity (low,
high). Target's Category (art,
math), Sex (male, female).
As predicted, Outgroup Power
had a strong effect on
subjects' feeling of control (see
Table 2):
the high
power condition subjects felt they
had less personal
control over the outcomes [F(l, 83)
=14 25, p=.000], and that
the distractors had more control
[F(l, 79) =7 17
p=.009].
They also felt they had lower concentration
abilities
[F(l,83)=14.25, p=.000] and were less
confident about doing
well at the test [F(l,83)=12.42, p=.001]2.
Power did not
have an impact on reported emotions. However,
subjects

m

.

.

,

reported feeling less tired, weary or unreactive in
the

2

Interestingly, females' feeling of control was lower
than that of males: Personal control [F(l, 83) =4 43 p=.03],
Distractor's control [F(l, 79) =9 41, p=.003]. Ability
[F(l,83)=3.71, p=.05]. Confidence [F(l, 83) =9 93 p=.002].
.

.

.

,

,

Table 2.

Peelings of control as
a function of outgroup

Outgroup Power
High

Personal control

Distractor's control
Self-confidence
Personal abilities

5.51 (n=47)

4.71 (n=51)

3.77 (n=44)

4.58 (n=50)

5.17 (n=47)

4.39 (n=51)

4.87 (n=47)

4.18 (n=51)
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high homogeneity compared
to low homogeneity
condition
[F(l,82=4.70, p=.03]3.
Attention Time

scores Of attention to
consistent and inconsistent
information were entered into
a mixed model analysis
of
variance (the previous
between-subjects variables plus
information Type (Consistent,
Inconsistent) as a repeated
measure)
As predicted, the analysis
yielded a two-way
.

interaction between Outgroup Power
and Information Type:
subjects paid more attention to
consistent information in
the low power condition, but the
opposite
was true in the

high power condition [F(l, 70) =12
93
.

,

p=.001].

also predicted that Outgroup Power
would increase
attention when homogeneity was low, but
that this would not
happen when homogeneity was high: This
interaction effect
was confirmed [F(l,70)=3.70, p=.05].
When attention to
consistencies and inconsistencies were entered
into two
separate analyses of variance, no effect reached
I

significance for consistent information.

For inconsistent

information, however, there was a main effect of Power
[F(l, 61) =5. 16, p=.02] and an interaction effect of Power
by

Homogeneity [F (1 61=4 43
,

.

,

p=.03]:

Subjects increased their

Also, males reported feeling less calm, relaxed or
at ease when the target was an Art major, while females
reported the same but for Math major [F(l,83)=9.29,
p=.003].

attention to inconsistencies
xsnencies in the high
power condition,
but only When homogeneity
was low (see Table 3
and 4).
Dispositional Inferences and
Impression Formed
The different numbers of
traits inferred by subjects
(total number, number of
typical, atypical and
irrelevant
number of positive, negative
and neutral) were entered
into
an analysis of variance,
with the usual variables.

m

As
predicted, the analysis yielded
a two-way interaction
between Power and Homogeneity
on the total number of
traits
[F(l,73)=3.85, p=.05].
In line with the attention
data,

subjects made more dispositional
inferences in the high
power condition when homogeneity
was Low, but the opposite
was true when homogeneity was high
(see Table
5)

.

interestingly, however, the power
manipulation did not
affect the typicality of the traits
inferred.
Subjects
simply inferred more typical traits when
homogeneity was
low [F(l,73)=5.60, p=.02], and more
irrelevant traits when
homogeneity was high [F(l, 73) =4 65, p=.03].
.

The number of positive and negative traits
were not

directly affected by the power manipulation^

However, a

significant interaction between Power and Homogeneity

occurred for neutral traits [F(l, 67)=8.44, p=.005]:
Subjects inferred more neutral traits in the high power

However, females inferred more positive traits than
males did [F(l, 73) =4 75, p=.031. Females also inferred more
negative traits in the high power condition while the
opposite was true for males [F(l,67)=6.21, p=.01].
.

Table

3.

Attention to consistent
i-cuu informat-i
or,
inrormation

(m

seconds)

Outgroup Power

4.
o
Outgroup

Homogeneity
High

"""^^^"^^^^

seconds)*

Low

High

19.95
n^TQ
^=19

iR
^^.15
n=20

21.84
n=19

n=i8

20 33

inconsistent information (in

Outgroup Power

Low

Outgroup
Homogeneity
High

Low

High

18.53
n=l9

n=20

20.53
n=19

20.72
n=18

22 95

Table 5. Dispositional inferences (number of traits
inferred)
Outgroup Power
Low

High

Low

2.77
n=22

3.^4
n=22

High

3.00
n=20

2.33
n=24

Outgroup
Homogeneity

condition When homogeneity
was low, but the opposite
was
true When homogeneity was
high.

Subjects- answers to the

second questionnaire were
entered into an analysis
of
variance with the usual variables.
The power manipulation
did not affect the general
impression that subjects
reported having formed^.
Discussion

The hypotheses were largely
confirmed.
clearly affected subjects' feeling

Outgroup Power

of control.

it

increased attention to the target,
but only when the
outgroup was heterogeneous, i.e. was
perceived as a
collection of individuals. it also led
to more
dispositional inferences, but again, only
when the outgroup
was heterogeneous. This suggests that,
in order to regain
indirect outcome control, people would be
motivated to pay

particular attention to the ones in power, as
long as they
are perceived as a collection of individuals,
but that

this

strategy would not be chosen when the ones in power
are

perceived as

a

homogeneous group.

The lack of result on

the questions designed to tap emotional reactions and the

impression formed may have resulted from the measures being
too obvious and so suggests the use of non-obtrusive

measures.

Along that line, the quality of dispositional

Females reported having formed a more positive
impression than males did [F(l, 75) =4 52 p=.03], and
subjects reported preferring in general Art majors to Math
majors [F(l, 61) =4 38 p=.04].
.

.

,

,

inferences was analv^f^H
analyzed.

o,,^
Surprisingly,
Outgroup Power did
not affect the typicality
une uraits
I of
trait-c inferred,
<r.^
^ the
although
subjects had paid more attention
to inconsistent

attributes.

•

.

Things happened as if,

m

order to restore

control, subjects would pay
more attention to the most
informative attributes, but when
asked to infer other
attributes, they would rely
primarily on their categorybased schema. Outgroup Homogeneity
did, however, affect
the quality of inferences:
Subjects inferred more typical
traits when the outgroup was
heterogeneous and more
irrelevant traits when the outgroup
was homogeneous. This
can be explained by the fact that
subjects anticipated

having to form an impression of the
other distractors too,
which would require differentiating them
from
each other.

Finally, the fact that subjects inferred
more neutral
traits in the High Power/Low Homogeneity
condition,

suggests that having paid more attention,
subjects would
form a less extreme impression of the target,
which is

consistent with the extremity-complexity hypothesis
(Linville, 1982)

CHAPTER

6

CONCLUSION

Started the present thesis
by asking what are the
psychological impacts of perceived
power differentials fro.
the perspective of the powerless.
Review of the social
psychological literature on power
indicated that the
problem did not receive the
attention it
I

deserves,

i

suggested that one reason for this
lacuna may be a confused
definition of the concept. Power
should be distinguished
from social influence or social
status and may be defined
in terms of outcome control in
a non-reciprocal

situation.
As a theoretical basis, the
literature on psychological
control led to considering the control
of one's own

outcomes as an important human motivation.

power became:

The question of

how the powerless will cope with a threat
to

their sense of control?
One answer came from the literature on impression
formation.

The continuum model, developed by Fiske and her

colleagues, postulates that people can be motivated to go

beyond initial stereotypes when the target of the
impression has some control over their outcomes.

In other

words, people will pay particular attention to the ones who

control their outcomes in an effort to restore a feeling of
control.

This individuating effect was verified in

situations of joint control over the outcomes, i.e.
43

cooperative and competitive
interpersonal interdepenaence.
vet, a strong test of
the „odel would be
to manipulate the
amount of control the target
has over the perceiver-s
outcomes in a non-reciprocal
situation, i.e. a situation
of
power relation. Furthermore,
if the crucial variable
is
control, the individuating
effect, previously

mentioned.
Should apply as well to situations
of intergroup relations,
some research suggested it does
not, as in intergroup
situations the best strategy to
gain control over one's
outcomes would
u be t:o
to pay
nav attention to mgroup
members with
whom one cooperates. To control
for this effect, I
4.

proposed to use

a

minimal group situation, such as

described by Tajfel and his colleagues,
and manipulate the
cognitive salience of the intergroup
dimension.
This first experiment investigated
the effect of
outgroup power and outgroup homogeneity
(the categorization
salience manipulation) on impression formation
processes.

Results showed that the power manipulation affected
subjects' feeling of control, and led to more
individuation
of the target, but only when the ones in power were

perceived as a collection of individuals (heterogeneous
condition)

.

This suggests that control motivation may

indeed cause individuation in interpersonal relations.

Interesting results suggested that, although control

deprivation led to more attention to atypical traits and
dispositional inferences, these inferences remained largely

based on stereotypical
expectations.
control induces a general

Maybe a loss of

activation of information

processing, leading to
increased attention to
both
environmental information (the
actual
traits)

information (the schema-based
traits)
was that the power manipulation

7

^

cognitive

a striking result

did not lead to

individuation when the ones in
power were perceived as a
salient outgroup (homogeneous
condition)
although
subjects, sense of control was
affected.
Outgroup members
are usually perceived as committed
to group
,

norms and

therefore more difficult to influence
than distinct
individuals. The perceived opportunity

to influence the

ones in power, in order to gain
indirect control over one's
outcomes, may then be a crucial
intermediate variable
between loss of control and individuation.
Obviously, many
hypotheses about the relation between control
and
impression formation in interpersonal and
intergroup

cooperation, competition, and power relation
remain to be
tested.
Let us come back to the question of the psychological

consequences of perceived power differentials for the
powerless, and more specifically

to the question of how

the powerless form an impression of the powerful.

people individualize the ones in power or not?
depends.

Do

Well, it

Data suggest that power leads to individuation

when it is perceived as belonging to individuals, but not

When it is perceived as
belonging to an outgroup.
This
differential impact of social
power, depending on how
power
IS categorized, opens
interesting questions,

m

particular, ™any hypotheses
on intergroup relations
and
social identity theory could
be tested by proposing
that
the group one identifies
with contributes to one-s
sense of
control.
How does group power affect
personal control?
How does perceived power
affect group identification?

Results from a first follow-up
study, manipulating power
categorization in a natural environment
are currently being
analyzed.
believe that investigating the
strategies by which
people cope with a loss of control
offers fascinating
perspectives for the understanding of
social change
processes. After all, what is politics
but a discourse on
power and its social partition?
I

APPENDIX A
STIMULUS MATERIAL

Studious:
Logical:

I
I

think of myself as being very
studious
try to be very logical in
all

Traditional:

People say that

conventional:

I

find

I

I

i

do

seem very traditional

can be conventional sometimes

Consistent with Art Major and Tnnnn.^.^e
nt with M.i-ho^.^^ cs

Creative:

have always chosen a creative way of living

I

Individualistic:

I

tend to be more of an individualistic

person
Emotional:

I

guess

Impulsive:

I

realize

I

am considered an emotional person
I

am a bit impulsive
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APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS

Instruc tions

fn>^

High Pnwe^r"iqn
Hnwer High u
Homoaf^n^j tv

Cnnriii-io..

It is very important
for students to be able to
concentrate for long periods
of time and study in

distracting environments, like
when you have to work at
home and your housemates are
distracting
you.

This is the

situation we want to reproduce
here today.
This experiment is part of a
vast study aiming at
testing and comparing the concentration
abilities of
different college students. The group
of subjects we want
to test today are
Your task, together with the other
subjects, will be
to write down numbers starting from
zero and adding three
each time (that is: 0, 3, 6,
9, 12,...) for 20 minutes.
You should do this as fast as possible, and
without
mistakes, because the number you will have reached,
after
20 minutes, will be the number of cents you will earn
in

the experiment (for example, if you go up to number

2

000

without mistakes, you will get $20).
However, in order to reproduce a distracting

environment, we have hired a group a students, lets call

them the distractors, who will sit in front of you and do

whatever they want (except touch you) in order to distract
you from your work.

You should try not to pay any
48
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attention and remain
am conof^n+concentrated on your work
because the

you have been distracted,
even slightly, they
will make you
start again from scratch.
The three distractors
have been recruited in
another
UMass department than the
subjects
uwjeci^s.
Thi..
This IS k
because we do
not want them to know you.
Actually, they
are

It is very important for
students to be able to
concentrate for long periods of
time and study in

distracting environments, like
when you have to work at
home and your housemates are
distracting
you.

This is the

situation we want to reproduce here
today.
This experiment is part of a vast

study aiming at

testing and comparing the concentration
abilities of
different college students. The group of

subjects we want

to test today are

Your task, together with the other subjects,
will be
to write down numbers starting from zero
and adding three
each time (that is: 0, 3, 6, 9, 12,...) for 20
minutes.

You should do this as fast as possible, and without

mistakes, because the number you will have reached, after
20 minutes, will be the number of cents you will earn in

the experiment (for example, if you go up to number 2000,

without mistakes, you will get $20)

However, in order to
reproduce e. distracting
environment, „e have hired
a group a students,
lets call
the» the distractors, who
win sit in front of you and
speak loudly with each other
in order to distract
you fro„
your work. Vou should try
not to pay any attention
and
remain concentrated on your
work.

The three distractors have
been recruited in other
UMass departments than the
subjects. This is because we
do
not want them to know you.
Actually one is a
the other a

and the third a

FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE

Please inaioate how you
feel right now by
giving a score
(using this scale: (not
at all,
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

(very

much,, to each of the
following groups of emotions:
- happy,

cheerful, or joyous

- angry,

irritated, or annoyed

- unhappy,

sad,

- frightened,

- energetic,
- tired,

-

worried, or threatened
aroused, or keyed-up

weary, or unreactive

- jittery,
- calm,

or gloomy

shaky, or nervous

relaxed, or at-ease

enthusiastic, alive, or alert

Would you say that your concentration
abilities are:
not very
^^^^
9°°^

1

2

3

5

4

6

7

good

How confident are you about doing well in this experiment
not very

confident

12

^e^^y
3

4

5

51

6

7

confident

?

How much control do
ao von
f^^i you
you feel
will have over your
outcomes in this experiment
?
.

very little

12345

control

a lot of
6

7

control

How much control doo vou
you fp<=i
^
feel the ^distractors
will have over
your outcomes in this
experiment

?

very little
control

12

a lot of
3

4

5

6

7

control

HOW hard do you expect the
distractors to try to disturb
you ?
not very

^"^^

12

excessively
3

5

4

6

7

hard

would you like, in a second step,
the roles to be reversed,
that is your group to become
distractors and the

distractors to become subjects

?

not at

very
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

much

APPENDIX D
SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE

HOW Clear is your
impression of this
distractor
very
very
unclear
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
clear
-

?

- HOW positive is your impression
of this distractor ?

not very
very

positive

1

2

3

4

5
^

6
°

^
V

positive

HOW do you feel about having
this person as one of the
distractors ?
-

rather

unhappy

very
1

2

3

5

4

6

7

happy

According to you what other personality
traits may
characterize this person ?
-

53

How typical of
person is

<=+-„ri^«4.
students

^
do
you think this

?

very
very

atypical

-

1

2

3

4

5

How much do you like
^

6

7

typical

^
^
students
in general
4.

not very
very
*

^

6

7

much

?
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